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Foreign Policy Association (US) Journalism

Doklam: China’s War Drums and the India-Bhutan Treaty

 

This article was first published on the Foreign Policy Association blogs here.

Summing up the general state of awareness in the world that we are living in, an overwhelming majority of the world seems to be either unaware of or unconcerned about the potentially catastrophic confrontation building up in the last two months in the Himalayas between India and China, the world’s two largest countries, which also happen to be the world’s second and the fourth largest economies, and, most worryingly, two nuclear armed nations that have the world’s most well-oiled defense apparatus.

The standoff, which is threatening to spiral out of control from the Chinese side, started when the one-party led Communist nation’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) started constructing a motorable road from Dokola in the Doklam area towards the Bhutan Army camp at Zompelri on June 16, 2017.

Bhutan, which believes the area is its territory, swiftly reacted, and in a press release issued on June 29, 2017, stated clearly that “the construction of the road inside Bhutanese territory is a direct violation of its agreements with China.

The Bhutanese foreign ministry further said:

” Boundary talks are ongoing between Bhutan and China and we have written agreements of 1988 and 1998 stating that the two sides agree to maintain peace and tranquillity in their border areas pending a final settlement on the boundary question, and to maintain status quo on the boundary as before March 1959. The agreements also state that the two sides will refrain from taking unilateral action, or use of force, to change the status quo of the boundary. Bhutan hopes that the status quo in the Doklam area will be maintained as before 16 June 2017.”

At the core of the dispute is the question of where the final tri-boundary point — the point at which India, China, and Bhutan meet — lies.

China argues that the India-China-Bhutan tri-junction is at Mount Gipmochi (Gyemo Chen), much south of Batang la, the place that India and Bhutan consider as the tri-junction.  China claims 89 sq km in Doklam (along Gamochen at the border, to the river divide at Batangla and Sinchela, and down to the Amo Chhu River) as its own.

But it is one of only four areas – as per Bhutan – over which China and Bhutan, who do not have diplomatic relations, have a dispute and have had 24 rounds of talks. China, however, claims much more than that and considers a total of seven areas as disputed areas.

China, it may be noted, has territorial disputes with virtually every neighbour of its. And if its conduct in the South China Sea and with Japan over Senkaku Islands is any indication, China does not really believe in giving in to other nation’s claims.

Therefore, much before the official press release by Bhutan, and just two days after the construction work by China began, on June 18, 2017, India sent around 270 troops, with weapons and two bulldozers and stopped the Chinese troops from constructing the road.

In a 15-page document released by the Chinese Foreign Ministry on the same day, Beijing said that “over 270 Indian soldiers, carrying weapons and driving two bulldozers advanced more than 100 meters into the Chinese territory to obstruct the road building of the Chinese side, causing tension in the area.”

It further accused India of raising the number of Indian soldiers to 400.

India’s ministry of defence, however, brushed aside the Chinese accusation of escalation and said that India has been maintaining 350-400 troops at Doklam ever since the stand-off began.

The Indian action is in accordance with the India-Bhutan Treaty of Friendship of 1949, which advocated India’s guiding role in Bhutan’s diplomatic and defense affairs.  Though the 1949 treaty was superseded by a new friendship treaty of 2007 that replaced the provision that made it mandatory for Bhutan to take India’s guidance on foreign policy.

The 2007 treaty provided broader sovereign rights to Bhutan by, for instance, not making it mandatory for Bhutan to take India’s permission in matters such as arms imports. But it did not alter much the inherent attached interests of the two nations.

Article 2 of the 2007 India-Bhutan Treaty says:

In keeping with the abiding ties of close friendship and cooperation between Bhutan and India, the Government of the Kingdom of Bhutan and the Government of the Republic of India shall cooperate closely with each other on issues relating to their national interests. Neither Government shall allow the use of its territory for activities harmful to the national security and interest of the other.

While sovereignty is the principal concern for Bhutan, the dispute for India beyond just the size of the territory in Doklam.

Picture Courtesy: Indian Defence Review

India is alarmed that if the Chinese do complete the motorable road in the Doklam area, it will give China an imposing access to India’s strategically vulnerable ‘chicken’s neck’ in the Siliguri Corridor, a 20km wide corridor that links India’s seven northeastern states to its mainland.

It may further be noted that Bhutan’s own administrative apparatus can get severely compromised if the Chinese inhabit Doklam as Bhutan’s communications network as it is connected through Siliguri in India.

At the moment, it is a stalemate. India is refusing to pull back its troops from the area that it says belongs to Bhutan. And China is threatening a bigger war every new day.

UPDATE:

As on August 28, 2017, India and China reached a consensus on disengagement of border personnel at the  faceoff site. A release by India’s ministry of external affairs said:

In recent weeks, India and China have maintained diplomatic communication in respect of the incident at Doklam. During these communications, we were able to express our views and convey our concerns and interests.

On this basis, expeditious disengagement of border personnel at the face-off site at Doklam has been agreed to and is on-going.

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Foreign Policy Association (US) Journalism

China saw Modi coming but not Modi’s India

The article was first published on the Foreign Policy Association network here.

Before Narendra Modi became the prime minister of India, some observers in China believed that he could well be “the Deng Xiaoping of India,” comparing him with the Chinese leader who led the economic reform that has transformed China to a global power from a Third World country.

Modi visited China three times during his days as the chief minister of the state of Gujarat (west coast of India) and was always accorded red carpet treatment by the Chinese. During his last such visit in 2011, he was met by but four Chinese politburo members. Though not a norm, most chief ministers get to meet just one. China clearly saw Modi coming.

More importantly, the Chinese also experienced firsthand the probable tenor of future discourse with Modi’s India when he in his discussion with Chinese administrators, including the mayor of Beijing, not only pointed “Chinese activities in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK)” but also about Pakistan “using China against India.”

While being a provincial leader, Modi was said to have warned China of damage to bilateral ties if China continued to play tango with Pakistan – before going on to tell the hosts that when in India, the Chinese should use Indian maps and not theirs, in a reference to the heat generated in India about Chinese company TBEA having distributed the map of India without some parts of Jammu and Kashmir, as well as the entire Arunachal Pradesh (both Indian states bordering China), at a business function in the Indian capital of New Delhi.

If the Chinese had seen Modi coming, they should’ve seen Modi’s India coming. But, it seems, they didn’t.

They wouldn’t have bargained for the entire South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) leadership to be present at Prime Minister Modi’s swearing in ceremony – not Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif at least. But before they could come out with the final analysis, Modi was already on a whirlwind charm offensive to Bhutan, Nepal (twice), China’s bête noire Japan, and its bitter rival, the United States.

It was more than exchange of business cards: In January, Sri Lanka President Mahinda Rajapaksa, the man who had decisively – and brutally – pulled the island nation out of long and bloody civil war, towards robust economic growth of seven percent a year, was quite remarkably put out of office by the country’s electorate.

Immediately after the election results, the region was awash with talks about the change having been engineered by India’s intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). India, of course, denied having anything to do with it but many neutrals pointed out to the uncanny coincidence of the expulsion of a RAW official by Sri Lanka during the run-up of the Jan. 8, 2015, Lankan elections. The official was recalled by India in December 2014 amid accusations that he helped shape the campaign of join opposition candidate Maithripala Sirisena – after persuading him to suddenly dump Rajapaksa.

Rajapaksa had long been upsetting India with his overtures to China and allowing the dragon to treat his country as a de facto strategic base – by means of pouring in billions of dollars for massive construction projects. The Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Sri Lanka in September 2014 to lay stone for a USD 1.5 billion port project, something that elicited a quick and unhappy reaction from India.

Despite his allowing China a strategic foothold in the Indian Ocean and despite pressure from the global community, especially the UNHRC, for alleged war crimes, India was cautious in going hard at Rajapaksa – because it could have perhaps him pushed even further closer to China.

But Indian officials believe he pushed things way too far when he allowed in September 2014 a Chinese submarine to dock in Colombo. Sri Lanka is bound by an existing agreement with India to inform the latter if any such actions are taken place. But it did not. And it did not when the submarine was docked again in November.

The Sirisena government has said that India is “the first concern” and has talked of reviewing all projects awarded to Chinese firms. This was a massive round to have won by Modi’s India, but there were many other battles that wherein India has now started pushing China back – at least in South Asia.

While Bhutan has reinforced its stand vis-à-vis India’s concerns, Modi’s two visits to Nepal in double-quick time — his initial visit being the first by an Indian PM after 17 years — has earned him a handle that can help him key in India’s interests into Nepal’s own social, economic and strategic interests. An early reflector of the convergence between the two is the signing of Power Trade Agreement (PTA), which allows exchange of electricity between the two neighbors while opening up other avenues in the hydropower sector.

In Bangladesh, where the China Harbour Engineering Company was expected to walk away with the tender for a $8 billion port power project India has suddenly found itself staring nervously at a rival bid by an Indian company from Modi’s home state of Gujarat.

Most recently, Modi’s India put out a strategic U.S.-India joint statement on “advancing shared security in Asia Pacific region” during the recent Barack Obama visit to New Delhi. China was left seething when Obama, in reference to the South China Sea issue, said that U.S. welcomes a greater role for India in the Asia Pacific, where “the freedom of navigation must be upheld and disputes must be resolved peacefully.” Much to China’s wariness, Obama also showed agreement with India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

All of that maneuvering by and in Modi’s India seems to have got under the skin of the notoriously reticent Chinese. An article in the Communist Party of China (CPC) controlled Global Times remarked, “The seemingly enthusiastic approach of the US and India and the romance between the two leaders do not suggest any substantial improvement in the bilateral ties of the two countries.”

The game is on.