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Foreign Policy Association (US) Journalism

Doklam: China’s War Drums and the India-Bhutan Treaty

 

This article was first published on the Foreign Policy Association blogs here.

Summing up the general state of awareness in the world that we are living in, an overwhelming majority of the world seems to be either unaware of or unconcerned about the potentially catastrophic confrontation building up in the last two months in the Himalayas between India and China, the world’s two largest countries, which also happen to be the world’s second and the fourth largest economies, and, most worryingly, two nuclear armed nations that have the world’s most well-oiled defense apparatus.

The standoff, which is threatening to spiral out of control from the Chinese side, started when the one-party led Communist nation’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) started constructing a motorable road from Dokola in the Doklam area towards the Bhutan Army camp at Zompelri on June 16, 2017.

Bhutan, which believes the area is its territory, swiftly reacted, and in a press release issued on June 29, 2017, stated clearly that “the construction of the road inside Bhutanese territory is a direct violation of its agreements with China.

The Bhutanese foreign ministry further said:

” Boundary talks are ongoing between Bhutan and China and we have written agreements of 1988 and 1998 stating that the two sides agree to maintain peace and tranquillity in their border areas pending a final settlement on the boundary question, and to maintain status quo on the boundary as before March 1959. The agreements also state that the two sides will refrain from taking unilateral action, or use of force, to change the status quo of the boundary. Bhutan hopes that the status quo in the Doklam area will be maintained as before 16 June 2017.”

At the core of the dispute is the question of where the final tri-boundary point — the point at which India, China, and Bhutan meet — lies.

China argues that the India-China-Bhutan tri-junction is at Mount Gipmochi (Gyemo Chen), much south of Batang la, the place that India and Bhutan consider as the tri-junction.  China claims 89 sq km in Doklam (along Gamochen at the border, to the river divide at Batangla and Sinchela, and down to the Amo Chhu River) as its own.

But it is one of only four areas – as per Bhutan – over which China and Bhutan, who do not have diplomatic relations, have a dispute and have had 24 rounds of talks. China, however, claims much more than that and considers a total of seven areas as disputed areas.

China, it may be noted, has territorial disputes with virtually every neighbour of its. And if its conduct in the South China Sea and with Japan over Senkaku Islands is any indication, China does not really believe in giving in to other nation’s claims.

Therefore, much before the official press release by Bhutan, and just two days after the construction work by China began, on June 18, 2017, India sent around 270 troops, with weapons and two bulldozers and stopped the Chinese troops from constructing the road.

In a 15-page document released by the Chinese Foreign Ministry on the same day, Beijing said that “over 270 Indian soldiers, carrying weapons and driving two bulldozers advanced more than 100 meters into the Chinese territory to obstruct the road building of the Chinese side, causing tension in the area.”

It further accused India of raising the number of Indian soldiers to 400.

India’s ministry of defence, however, brushed aside the Chinese accusation of escalation and said that India has been maintaining 350-400 troops at Doklam ever since the stand-off began.

The Indian action is in accordance with the India-Bhutan Treaty of Friendship of 1949, which advocated India’s guiding role in Bhutan’s diplomatic and defense affairs.  Though the 1949 treaty was superseded by a new friendship treaty of 2007 that replaced the provision that made it mandatory for Bhutan to take India’s guidance on foreign policy.

The 2007 treaty provided broader sovereign rights to Bhutan by, for instance, not making it mandatory for Bhutan to take India’s permission in matters such as arms imports. But it did not alter much the inherent attached interests of the two nations.

Article 2 of the 2007 India-Bhutan Treaty says:

In keeping with the abiding ties of close friendship and cooperation between Bhutan and India, the Government of the Kingdom of Bhutan and the Government of the Republic of India shall cooperate closely with each other on issues relating to their national interests. Neither Government shall allow the use of its territory for activities harmful to the national security and interest of the other.

While sovereignty is the principal concern for Bhutan, the dispute for India beyond just the size of the territory in Doklam.

Picture Courtesy: Indian Defence Review

India is alarmed that if the Chinese do complete the motorable road in the Doklam area, it will give China an imposing access to India’s strategically vulnerable ‘chicken’s neck’ in the Siliguri Corridor, a 20km wide corridor that links India’s seven northeastern states to its mainland.

It may further be noted that Bhutan’s own administrative apparatus can get severely compromised if the Chinese inhabit Doklam as Bhutan’s communications network as it is connected through Siliguri in India.

At the moment, it is a stalemate. India is refusing to pull back its troops from the area that it says belongs to Bhutan. And China is threatening a bigger war every new day.

UPDATE:

As on August 28, 2017, India and China reached a consensus on disengagement of border personnel at the  faceoff site. A release by India’s ministry of external affairs said:

In recent weeks, India and China have maintained diplomatic communication in respect of the incident at Doklam. During these communications, we were able to express our views and convey our concerns and interests.

On this basis, expeditious disengagement of border personnel at the face-off site at Doklam has been agreed to and is on-going.

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Change Communication Cinema Communication Health Communication

Toilet: Ek Development Communication Katha

Official Poster: Toilet: Ek Prem Katha

Akshay Kumar is fast emerging as a very unlikely bearer of varied and content-driven Hindi cinema. Derided by the reigning Hindi cinema establishment and its audience bank as ‘Bharat Kumar 2.0’ for his off-screen nationalistic messages and works, the prolific actor’s latest film – despite its shortcomings – could end up as a case study on development communication, or Communication for Development (C4D), in the Indian context.

Director Shree Narayan Singh’s Toilet: Ek Prem Katha (TEPK) is a social satire revolving around Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Swachh Bharat Abhiyan.

Keshav (Akshay Kumar) and Jaya (Bhumi Pednekar) are natives of two adjoining rural neighbourhoods of Mathura district in Uttar Pradesh. After a brief period of wooing and cajoling by Keshav, Jaya gives in and the two get married.

But the marriage begins on a disastrous note when Jaya finds out that there is no toilet in the Keshav household – and, after many unsuccessful attempts to fit in, walks away from him.

Left with no other option, Keshav sets out to make things right – and, in the process, takes on the well-entrenched mindsets, social barriers, and the administrative mechanisms of our country.

Acknowledged in the end credits of the film, avid news readers are able to recollect that the genesis of the film lies in the real life story of a young girl Anita Bai Narre from Betul, Madhya Pradesh.

But there have been a few other similar instances too. For example, Kanpur girl Neha Shrivastav had walked away from marriage just four days prior to the date for the same reason. Neha told the media at the time that she had taken the step after getting inspired by a Vidya Balan advertisement about toilets at home.

The two examples are significant. The former has given birth to a C4D driven movie while the latter took inspiration from a C4D message to give birth to a social reaction (from an individual, to begin with).

Put together, the examples illustrate the symbiotic relationship between C4D and society. On the one hand, C4D is about understanding and giving a voice to the needs of the society, but on the other, it is also about drawing out a response from the society by means of that voice.

TEPK is a good example of being an agent of both ends of the cycle.

If a thoroughly utilitarian social communication featuring film star Vidya Balan – in an old DAVP packaging – could inspire a young woman in a conservative society like Kanpur to call off a monumental social milestone like marriage, then the ripple effects of the latest Akshay Kumar film can potentially be immense – especially in those sections of the society that are exposed to and influenced by Hindi cinema.

For, mind you, unlike, say the Vidya Balan communication, a film like TEPK intrinsically possess many elements that stay in the heads and minds of those exposed to it. For instance, Hans Mat Pagli song, a rare old-world melodious composition in the voice of Sonu Nigam, is a runaway hit. How can the person crooning the song not remember, every once in a while, the subject of the film?

Then there is the hilarious episode of the leading man getting married to a buffalo (not a spoiler, it was revealed in the film’s first trailer itself) to fight off the ‘Manglik Dosh’. The episode is played indirectly throughout the film – making it just as memorable as the basic premise of the film. Sometimes, it is imperative to illustrate how archaic some of the beliefs ‘look to the naked eye’ to force the believers to rethink them.

Again, which film had this scene? Ah, the film about building toilets at home, especially for the women of the family.

Then there is that rather strong view by the head of the family on the “impossibility of the Sacred Tulsi (Holy Basil) plant sharing the courtyard with a toilet”. It forms one of the milestone episodes of the film.

And we are not even talking about the very obvious subjects of not just humiliation but security hazards for women who are forced to answer nature’s call in the open. TEPK actually begins by highlighting (via the headlights of a tractor, if you will) the issue.

In other words, TEPK weaves together many such social issues into the singular premise of the film viz., building a toilet at home. And thereby talks about it in a complete socio-cultural context (of a sizeable section of the vast Indian society).

Using the story of the lead pair, their immediate families, and their surroundings, TEPK seems to stay true to the various United Nations (UN) organisations’ approach towards C4D via the following four interlinked goals:

  1. Behaviour Change Communication (in TEPK, it is primarily about the head of the house)
  2. Communication for Social Change (in TEPK, it relates to changing the thinking of both the panchayat and the villagers)
  3. Communication for Advocacy (in TEPK, the stress on overall sanitation is put through advocacy at local and regional government machinery)
  4. Strengthening an Enabling Media and Communications Environment (in TEPK, the lead pair not only makes use of an insider at a major Hindi daily but also media at large)

As per the United Nations Development Group (UNDG),

the greatest challenge the communicator faces is the preparation and distribution of development messages to millions of people in such a way that they are received and understood, accepted and applied. If they accept this challenge they will be able to get the people to identify themselves as part of a society and a nation. This identity will help in harnessing these human resources for the total welfare of the individual and community at large“.

This is where TEPK scores. It has made sure that the message is indeed received, understood and accepted by millions. It manages to do so by using an enchanting mix of humour, romance and the quintessentially Indian high pitch drama at places.

There is absolutely no doubt about the acceptance of the film by rural folks. But will they ‘apply’ the C4D message?

Well, “Mera Desh Badal Raha Hai“. And I am optimistic that the film would have a ripple effect – of whatever magnitude – in some geographies of the so-called Hindi belt. That is why I believe the film might end up becoming a case study on development communication in the decades to come.

All theories aside, however, TEPK is an enjoyable family watch. The author took his 67-year-old mother along and she loved it. “More such films should be made,” she said.

Not without its flaws, go watch the film for absolutely smashing performances by Akshay Kumar, Bhumi Pednekar and Divyendu Sharma. The direction is very good at most places. The editing, adroit at most places, could have been tighter in the second half.

Warning: You might end up humming ‘Hans Mat Pagli’ for the remainder of the day after watching the film.

3 stars for the cinema; 5 for being an agent of change.

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Foreign Policy Association (US) Indian Subcontinent Journalism

‘Eastward Ho’ for India-led South Asia?

Trade blocs across the globe have often been just as much, if not more, instruments of geopolitics as they have been about commerce. A gradual but definite swell in cooperation between the South Asian nations east of Pakistan currently is playing witness to the age-old truism.

With South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) currently lying comatose due to the India-Pakistan conflict, India is now citing the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) as an alternative that may potentially isolate Pakistan in South Asia.

India’s increased activities within and with BIMSTEC nations is a clear warning by India to Pakistan over the current deadlock of dialogue between the two countries because of the terror attacks on Indian soil, almost all of which emanate from Pakistan.

After pulling out of the 19th SAARC Summit in Islamabad in November 9-10, 2016, which led to pull outs by all the remaining member nations too, India – along with Bangladesh – did not attend a three-day regional conference held in Islamabad beginning December 19 to  promote innovation for sustainable development and discuss strategy of the Asian and Pacific Centre for Transfer of Technology (APCTT). The conference, significantly, was held under the aegis of the United Nations.

On the other hand, India went out of the way to promote BIMSTEC at the 8th BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) Summit in Goa, India on October 15-16. Dubbed as one of the highlights of the Summit by many in India, the host nation facilitated a BRICS-BIMSTEC Outreach Summit, where the BRICS leaders met the heads of government of the BIMSTEC countries.

The selection of BIMSTEC for engagement with BRICS was both significant and deliberate by India.

While it fits India’s long-term Act East Policy, which aims at strengthening trade and bilateral relations with the South-East Asian nations, with India’s northeast region as the transit base, the October invitation to BIMSTEC to the BRICS summit also suited India’s immediate concerns.

In a major victory for India against Pakistan, BIMSTEC Leaders’ Retreat 2016 Outcome Document reiterated its stand:

“We strongly believe that our fight against terrorism should not only seek to disrupt and eliminate terrorists, terror organisations and networks, but should also identify, hold accountable and take strong measures against States who encourage, support and finance terrorism, provide sanctuary to terrorists and terror groups, and falsely extol their virtues. There should be no glorification of terrorists as martyrs.”

The statement was a near replica of the one released later by the boycotting SAARC member states at the time of pulling out of the Summit in Islamabad in November.

In other words, by trade or by trick, India had managed to get all the South Asian nations—and indeed Thailand and Myanmar—together to send a message to Pakistan to put a lid on terror activities emanating from its soil.

It was as much a diplomatic victory for India as it was an expression of exasperation of the other nations with regards the comatose nature of cooperation in South Asia via SAARC due to the conflict between the two biggest member states of the Association.

The boycott of events and the pointed nature of joint statements is not an ad-hoc development. As stated earlier, it is India taking a lead out of the general exasperation of the South Asian nations – particularly India and Bangladesh—with the issue of Pakistani-originating terror completely bringing to halt any future-looking trade and development issues of the region.

To that effect, India in September 2016 approved $1.04-billion for constructing and upgrading 558 km of roads to link it with Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Nepal and ease the movement of passengers and cargo within the region.

Funded equally by India and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the primary purpose of the Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal (BBIN) road initiative is to increase the intra-regional trade by over 60%.

A much more expansive project than BBIN is the  Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC), which though was established way back in 2000 in Laos, is receiving renewed attention. Named after Ganga and Mekong, the two of the largest rivers of the region, the grouping is about building tourism, culture, education and transportation linkages between India, Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.

While MGC might not be moving as well as the promoters would’ve liked it to, there are other examples that actually are.

The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project has been identified for special focus by the BIMSTEC Transport Infrastructure and Logistics Study (BTILS). It will connect the eastern Indian seaport of Kolkata with Myanmar’s Sittwe seaport by sea in the first phase – and then link Sittwe to Paletwa in the same country via Kaladan River route, before connecting Paletwa to the Indian state of Mizoram by road. Originally scheduled to be completed by 2014, it is running behind schedule, but moving well now.

Another one identified by the BTILS is the India–Myanmar–Thailand (IMT) Trilateral Highway, an under-construction highway that will connect Moreh in India with Mae Sot in Thailand via Myanmar. The road had a trial run in November 2015 itself, with Indian vehicles traveling to Naypyidaw in Myanmar via the Imphal-Mandalay-Bagan-Naypyidaw route and back. Myanmarese vehicles had joined the Indian vehicles on the return journey.

With a clear view of expanding the India-ASEAN Free Trade Area trade, India has proposed extending the highway to Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.

The most interesting one, however, is the Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor. The multi-modal (road, rail, water and air linkages) corridor will be the first expressway between India and China and will pass through Myanmar and Bangladesh—covering a total area of about 1.65 million square kilometers.

This is interesting because it brings together two traditional and intense rivals, India and China—and also because China has put all its eggs in the Pakistani basket in the longstanding India-Pakistan conflict, the very reason for which India is looking and leading other nations eastwards.

There remain many miles before all the mentioned projects lay the final brick. But it is amply clear that the terrorism emanating from Pakistan—and indeed the steadfast refusal by the Pakistani government to both stop supporting the terror groups and acknowledging their presence on its soil—has led to a steady rise in activities on the east of South Asia. At the moment, it is indeed ‘Eastward Ho’ for the India-led South Asia.

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Foreign Policy Association (US) Journalism

China saw Modi coming but not Modi’s India

The article was first published on the Foreign Policy Association network here.

Before Narendra Modi became the prime minister of India, some observers in China believed that he could well be “the Deng Xiaoping of India,” comparing him with the Chinese leader who led the economic reform that has transformed China to a global power from a Third World country.

Modi visited China three times during his days as the chief minister of the state of Gujarat (west coast of India) and was always accorded red carpet treatment by the Chinese. During his last such visit in 2011, he was met by but four Chinese politburo members. Though not a norm, most chief ministers get to meet just one. China clearly saw Modi coming.

More importantly, the Chinese also experienced firsthand the probable tenor of future discourse with Modi’s India when he in his discussion with Chinese administrators, including the mayor of Beijing, not only pointed “Chinese activities in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK)” but also about Pakistan “using China against India.”

While being a provincial leader, Modi was said to have warned China of damage to bilateral ties if China continued to play tango with Pakistan – before going on to tell the hosts that when in India, the Chinese should use Indian maps and not theirs, in a reference to the heat generated in India about Chinese company TBEA having distributed the map of India without some parts of Jammu and Kashmir, as well as the entire Arunachal Pradesh (both Indian states bordering China), at a business function in the Indian capital of New Delhi.

If the Chinese had seen Modi coming, they should’ve seen Modi’s India coming. But, it seems, they didn’t.

They wouldn’t have bargained for the entire South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) leadership to be present at Prime Minister Modi’s swearing in ceremony – not Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif at least. But before they could come out with the final analysis, Modi was already on a whirlwind charm offensive to Bhutan, Nepal (twice), China’s bête noire Japan, and its bitter rival, the United States.

It was more than exchange of business cards: In January, Sri Lanka President Mahinda Rajapaksa, the man who had decisively – and brutally – pulled the island nation out of long and bloody civil war, towards robust economic growth of seven percent a year, was quite remarkably put out of office by the country’s electorate.

Immediately after the election results, the region was awash with talks about the change having been engineered by India’s intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). India, of course, denied having anything to do with it but many neutrals pointed out to the uncanny coincidence of the expulsion of a RAW official by Sri Lanka during the run-up of the Jan. 8, 2015, Lankan elections. The official was recalled by India in December 2014 amid accusations that he helped shape the campaign of join opposition candidate Maithripala Sirisena – after persuading him to suddenly dump Rajapaksa.

Rajapaksa had long been upsetting India with his overtures to China and allowing the dragon to treat his country as a de facto strategic base – by means of pouring in billions of dollars for massive construction projects. The Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Sri Lanka in September 2014 to lay stone for a USD 1.5 billion port project, something that elicited a quick and unhappy reaction from India.

Despite his allowing China a strategic foothold in the Indian Ocean and despite pressure from the global community, especially the UNHRC, for alleged war crimes, India was cautious in going hard at Rajapaksa – because it could have perhaps him pushed even further closer to China.

But Indian officials believe he pushed things way too far when he allowed in September 2014 a Chinese submarine to dock in Colombo. Sri Lanka is bound by an existing agreement with India to inform the latter if any such actions are taken place. But it did not. And it did not when the submarine was docked again in November.

The Sirisena government has said that India is “the first concern” and has talked of reviewing all projects awarded to Chinese firms. This was a massive round to have won by Modi’s India, but there were many other battles that wherein India has now started pushing China back – at least in South Asia.

While Bhutan has reinforced its stand vis-à-vis India’s concerns, Modi’s two visits to Nepal in double-quick time — his initial visit being the first by an Indian PM after 17 years — has earned him a handle that can help him key in India’s interests into Nepal’s own social, economic and strategic interests. An early reflector of the convergence between the two is the signing of Power Trade Agreement (PTA), which allows exchange of electricity between the two neighbors while opening up other avenues in the hydropower sector.

In Bangladesh, where the China Harbour Engineering Company was expected to walk away with the tender for a $8 billion port power project India has suddenly found itself staring nervously at a rival bid by an Indian company from Modi’s home state of Gujarat.

Most recently, Modi’s India put out a strategic U.S.-India joint statement on “advancing shared security in Asia Pacific region” during the recent Barack Obama visit to New Delhi. China was left seething when Obama, in reference to the South China Sea issue, said that U.S. welcomes a greater role for India in the Asia Pacific, where “the freedom of navigation must be upheld and disputes must be resolved peacefully.” Much to China’s wariness, Obama also showed agreement with India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

All of that maneuvering by and in Modi’s India seems to have got under the skin of the notoriously reticent Chinese. An article in the Communist Party of China (CPC) controlled Global Times remarked, “The seemingly enthusiastic approach of the US and India and the romance between the two leaders do not suggest any substantial improvement in the bilateral ties of the two countries.”

The game is on.

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Foreign Policy Association (US) Journalism

India Just Scored a Self Goal

[The analysis was first published here on the Foreign Policy Association (FPA) blog network site]

Engineering of election results in Bhutan falls much short of a diplomatic victory of India

At the peak of campaigning by Bhutan’s two political parties for the recently concluded National Assembly (NA) elections, word spread that India was unhappy with the shrill nature of arguments – and their counters – related to India. Almost immediately, the said conversation was cooled down by both the parties and the campaigning from thereon stayed clear of it.

But the mood of the electorate was already set by opposition People’s Democratic Party (PDP), which spearheaded a pitched call to bring Bhutan deeper into India’s political sphere of influence, for the sake of India’s strategic and financial support.

The ruling Druk Phuensum Tshogpa Party (DPT), on the other hand, struggled to dispel the PDP charge that the closeness of the previous prime minister Jigme Thinley with China was pushing India towards withdrawing economic oxygen to Thimpu.

India’s stalling of kerosene and cooking gas subsidy grants to Bhutan on July 1, just weeks before the election date, which pushed up prices by three times, was seen by most ordinary Bhutanese affected by the price rise as an argument in favour of the PDP charge.

It did not matter that India officially dubbed the subsidy reduction as a “procedural issue” and that some Bhutanese thinkers equated the Indian action with a business tit-for-tat against revised power export rate from Bhutan.”

PDP won 32 seats in the 47-member NA in the July 13 elections – up exponentially from a mere two seats in the previous assembly.

It was the result that India wanted, except that it may not have factored in the long-term cost of the “perceived means” to the end.

The subsidy issue right ahead of elections invited accusations from certain sections of India’s dishonesty, manipulation and gross interference in Bhutan’s election process.

Speaking, perhaps for a growing community in his nation, Wangcha Sangey, a legal consultant based in capital Thimpu, wrote in his blog: “National interests of Bhutan have to rise over and above the politics of always playing the Indian tune. […] Bhutan and Bhutanese are sovereignty unto our self. Therefore Bhutan’s paramount national interests and affairs just cannot be only pleasing India. We have to please ourselves too!”

Reflecting the extent of his anger at India’s perceived high-handedness, he then went on to write: “We are not paid sex workers that benefactors need to know when our eyelashes and asses move and in which direction.”

By “national interest” and “the direction” in which Bhutan needs to move, he was alluding to the furor caused by Thinley’s May 2012 meeting with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in Rio de Janeiro at the sidelines of Rio+20 summit in Brazil.

While on one hand abuse was heaped upon him by fellow Bhutanese for “endangering historical ties with India” by being cordial with the latter’s bitter rival, India saw Thinley government’s import order of 20 buses from China during the Rio meeting as strengthening of Thimpu’s commercial relationship with China at the cost of India.

More than that one meeting, India’s heightened sensitivity rested on Thinley government’s decision to go on a diplomatic overdrive and establish diplomatic relations with a whopping 32 countries during its five-year reign – up to 53 countries in 2013 from the 21 that existed in 2008.

Indians saw the frenzy as undue haste in acting upon a 2007 revision of the 1949 India-Bhutan Treaty of Friendship, which till then allowed India to “guide” Bhutan’s foreign policy, and had a provision wherein both nations needed to consult each other closely on foreign and defence affairs.

The new treaty replaced the provision requiring Bhutan to take India’s “guidance” on foreign policy with broader “sovereignty” and enabled Bhutan to not require India’s permission over arms imports.

Already uncomfortable with Bhutan’s urgency in spreading out, what got India’s goat eventually were reports that Bhutan was preparing to establish diplomatic relations with the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council – including, and most worryingly, China.

Bhutan remains the only one of China’s 14 neighbors with which the dragon doesn’t have diplomatic relations. In the long-drawn battle for supremacy between China and India, New Delhi has always suspected Beijing of trying to win over Bhutan from India’s ambit.

But the big questions doing round in Bhutan and amidst many policy corners of India is whether that fear of India should be reason enough for India to go for the sledgehammer – especially against the backdrop of historical and geopolitical realities.

Bhutan shares a 605-kilometer (376-mile) border with India, which is its largest trading partner, accounting for 98 percent of its exports and 90 percent of its imports. Also, Bhutan’s only means of doing trade with the rest of the world so far is via 16 entry and exit points that India allows.

Against the seemingly claustrophobic arrangement, India has invested over $1 billion on the construction of three hydropower projects in Bhutan and has agreed to import at least 5,000 megawatts of electricity from Bhutan by 2020. Sale of electricity to India is one of the major exchange earners for Bhutan.

Bhutan also hosts an estimated 200,000 Indians – including Indian troops, which help Bhutan stay clear of and secure from terrorism and sectarian extremism.

It is because of this intertwined nature of relations that even at this discomforting hour writers like Kinley Dorji, the managing editor of Bhutan’s news daily Kuensel, argue: “Sovereignty – which India’s critics in the kingdom cite – works not in the abstract, but in daily lives as well. Bhutan and India, he notes, share a symbiotic relationship and it is in Bhutan’s interests to have closer relations with India than with China.”

Of course, and reflecting the general mood, he also carried on and advised in the same vein that it is in India’s interest to offer financial and technical help to Bhutan.

One of Sangey’s angry posts was titled: “India-Bhutan: Friend or Master.” Unless India begins to come across as the former – again – in the eyes of the hurting Bhutanese, it may not be able to hold on to its geopolitical need to be the latter.

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