south asia – Anshuman Rawat

‘Eastward Ho’ for India-led South Asia?

Trade blocs across the globe have often been just as much, if not more, instruments of geopolitics as they have been about commerce. A gradual but definite swell in cooperation between the South Asian nations east of Pakistan currently is playing witness to the age-old truism.

With South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) currently lying comatose due to the India-Pakistan conflict, India is now citing the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) as an alternative that may potentially isolate Pakistan in South Asia.

India’s increased activities within and with BIMSTEC nations is a clear warning by India to Pakistan over the current deadlock of dialogue between the two countries because of the terror attacks on Indian soil, almost all of which emanate from Pakistan.

After pulling out of the 19th SAARC Summit in Islamabad in November 9-10, 2016, which led to pull outs by all the remaining member nations too, India – along with Bangladesh – did not attend a three-day regional conference held in Islamabad beginning December 19 to promote innovation for sustainable development and discuss strategy of the Asian and Pacific Centre for Transfer of Technology (APCTT). The conference, significantly, was held under the aegis of the United Nations.

On the other hand, India went out of the way to promote BIMSTEC at the 8th BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) Summit in Goa, India on October 15-16. Dubbed as one of the highlights of the Summit by many in India, the host nation facilitated a BRICS-BIMSTEC Outreach Summit, where the BRICS leaders met the heads of government of the BIMSTEC countries.

The selection of BIMSTEC for engagement with BRICS was both significant and deliberate by India.

While it fits India’s long-term Act East Policy, which aims at strengthening trade and bilateral relations with the South-East Asian nations, with India’s northeast region as the transit base, the October invitation to BIMSTEC to the BRICS summit also suited India’s immediate concerns.

In a major victory for India against Pakistan, BIMSTEC Leaders’ Retreat 2016 Outcome Document reiterated its stand:

“We strongly believe that our fight against terrorism should not only seek to disrupt and eliminate terrorists, terror organisations and networks, but should also identify, hold accountable and take strong measures against States who encourage, support and finance terrorism, provide sanctuary to terrorists and terror groups, and falsely extol their virtues. There should be no glorification of terrorists as martyrs.”

The statement was a near replica of the one released later by the boycotting SAARC member states at the time of pulling out of the Summit in Islamabad in November.

In other words, by trade or by trick, India had managed to get all the South Asian nations—and indeed Thailand and Myanmar—together to send a message to Pakistan to put a lid on terror activities emanating from its soil.

It was as much a diplomatic victory for India as it was an expression of exasperation of the other nations with regards the comatose nature of cooperation in South Asia via SAARC due to the conflict between the two biggest member states of the Association.

The boycott of events and the pointed nature of joint statements is not an ad-hoc development. As stated earlier, it is India taking a lead out of the general exasperation of the South Asian nations – particularly India and Bangladesh—with the issue of Pakistani-originating terror completely bringing to halt any future-looking trade and development issues of the region.

To that effect, India in September 2016 approved $1.04-billion for constructing and upgrading 558 km of roads to link it with Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Nepal and ease the movement of passengers and cargo within the region.

Funded equally by India and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the primary purpose of the Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal (BBIN) road initiative is to increase the intra-regional trade by over 60%.

A much more expansive project than BBIN is the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC), which though was established way back in 2000 in Laos, is receiving renewed attention. Named after Ganga and Mekong, the two of the largest rivers of the region, the grouping is about building tourism, culture, education and transportation linkages between India, Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.

While MGC might not be moving as well as the promoters would’ve liked it to, there are other examples that actually are.

The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project has been identified for special focus by the BIMSTEC Transport Infrastructure and Logistics Study (BTILS). It will connect the eastern Indian seaport of Kolkata with Myanmar’s Sittwe seaport by sea in the first phase – and then link Sittwe to Paletwa in the same country via Kaladan River route, before connecting Paletwa to the Indian state of Mizoram by road. Originally scheduled to be completed by 2014, it is running behind schedule, but moving well now.

Another one identified by the BTILS is the India–Myanmar–Thailand (IMT) Trilateral Highway, an under-construction highway that will connect Moreh in India with Mae Sot in Thailand via Myanmar. The road had a trial run in November 2015 itself, with Indian vehicles traveling to Naypyidaw in Myanmar via the Imphal-Mandalay-Bagan-Naypyidaw route and back. Myanmarese vehicles had joined the Indian vehicles on the return journey.

With a clear view of expanding the India-ASEAN Free Trade Area trade, India has proposed extending the highway to Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.

The most interesting one, however, is the Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor. The multi-modal (road, rail, water and air linkages) corridor will be the first expressway between India and China and will pass through Myanmar and Bangladesh—covering a total area of about 1.65 million square kilometers.

This is interesting because it brings together two traditional and intense rivals, India and China—and also because China has put all its eggs in the Pakistani basket in the longstanding India-Pakistan conflict, the very reason for which India is looking and leading other nations eastwards.

There remain many miles before all the mentioned projects lay the final brick. But it is amply clear that the terrorism emanating from Pakistan—and indeed the steadfast refusal by the Pakistani government to both stop supporting the terror groups and acknowledging their presence on its soil—has led to a steady rise in activities on the east of South Asia. At the moment, it is indeed ‘Eastward Ho’ for the India-led South Asia.

India Just Scored a Self Goal

[The analysis was first published here on the Foreign Policy Association (FPA) blog network site]

Engineering of election results in Bhutan falls much short of a diplomatic victory of India

At the peak of campaigning by Bhutan’s two political parties for the recently concluded National Assembly (NA) elections, word spread that India was unhappy with the shrill nature of arguments – and their counters – related to India. Almost immediately, the said conversation was cooled down by both the parties and the campaigning from thereon stayed clear of it.

But the mood of the electorate was already set by opposition People’s Democratic Party (PDP), which spearheaded a pitched call to bring Bhutan deeper into India’s political sphere of influence, for the sake of India’s strategic and financial support.

The ruling Druk Phuensum Tshogpa Party (DPT), on the other hand, struggled to dispel the PDP charge that the closeness of the previous prime minister Jigme Thinley with China was pushing India towards withdrawing economic oxygen to Thimpu.

India’s stalling of kerosene and cooking gas subsidy grants to Bhutan on July 1, just weeks before the election date, which pushed up prices by three times, was seen by most ordinary Bhutanese affected by the price rise as an argument in favour of the PDP charge.

It did not matter that India officially dubbed the subsidy reduction as a “procedural issue” and that some Bhutanese thinkers equated the Indian action with a business tit-for-tat against revised power export rate from Bhutan.”

PDP won 32 seats in the 47-member NA in the July 13 elections – up exponentially from a mere two seats in the previous assembly.

It was the result that India wanted, except that it may not have factored in the long-term cost of the “perceived means” to the end.

The subsidy issue right ahead of elections invited accusations from certain sections of India’s dishonesty, manipulation and gross interference in Bhutan’s election process.

Speaking, perhaps for a growing community in his nation, Wangcha Sangey, a legal consultant based in capital Thimpu, wrote in his blog: “National interests of Bhutan have to rise over and above the politics of always playing the Indian tune. […] Bhutan and Bhutanese are sovereignty unto our self. Therefore Bhutan’s paramount national interests and affairs just cannot be only pleasing India. We have to please ourselves too!”

Reflecting the extent of his anger at India’s perceived high-handedness, he then went on to write: “We are not paid sex workers that benefactors need to know when our eyelashes and asses move and in which direction.”

By “national interest” and “the direction” in which Bhutan needs to move, he was alluding to the furor caused by Thinley’s May 2012 meeting with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in Rio de Janeiro at the sidelines of Rio+20 summit in Brazil.

While on one hand abuse was heaped upon him by fellow Bhutanese for “endangering historical ties with India” by being cordial with the latter’s bitter rival, India saw Thinley government’s import order of 20 buses from China during the Rio meeting as strengthening of Thimpu’s commercial relationship with China at the cost of India.

More than that one meeting, India’s heightened sensitivity rested on Thinley government’s decision to go on a diplomatic overdrive and establish diplomatic relations with a whopping 32 countries during its five-year reign – up to 53 countries in 2013 from the 21 that existed in 2008.

Indians saw the frenzy as undue haste in acting upon a 2007 revision of the 1949 India-Bhutan Treaty of Friendship, which till then allowed India to “guide” Bhutan’s foreign policy, and had a provision wherein both nations needed to consult each other closely on foreign and defence affairs.

The new treaty replaced the provision requiring Bhutan to take India’s “guidance” on foreign policy with broader “sovereignty” and enabled Bhutan to not require India’s permission over arms imports.

Already uncomfortable with Bhutan’s urgency in spreading out, what got India’s goat eventually were reports that Bhutan was preparing to establish diplomatic relations with the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council – including, and most worryingly, China.

Bhutan remains the only one of China’s 14 neighbors with which the dragon doesn’t have diplomatic relations. In the long-drawn battle for supremacy between China and India, New Delhi has always suspected Beijing of trying to win over Bhutan from India’s ambit.

But the big questions doing round in Bhutan and amidst many policy corners of India is whether that fear of India should be reason enough for India to go for the sledgehammer – especially against the backdrop of historical and geopolitical realities.

Bhutan shares a 605-kilometer (376-mile) border with India, which is its largest trading partner, accounting for 98 percent of its exports and 90 percent of its imports. Also, Bhutan’s only means of doing trade with the rest of the world so far is via 16 entry and exit points that India allows.

Against the seemingly claustrophobic arrangement, India has invested over $1 billion on the construction of three hydropower projects in Bhutan and has agreed to import at least 5,000 megawatts of electricity from Bhutan by 2020. Sale of electricity to India is one of the major exchange earners for Bhutan.

Bhutan also hosts an estimated 200,000 Indians – including Indian troops, which help Bhutan stay clear of and secure from terrorism and sectarian extremism.

It is because of this intertwined nature of relations that even at this discomforting hour writers like Kinley Dorji, the managing editor of Bhutan’s news daily Kuensel, argue: “Sovereignty – which India’s critics in the kingdom cite – works not in the abstract, but in daily lives as well. Bhutan and India, he notes, share a symbiotic relationship and it is in Bhutan’s interests to have closer relations with India than with China.”

Of course, and reflecting the general mood, he also carried on and advised in the same vein that it is in India’s interest to offer financial and technical help to Bhutan.

One of Sangey’s angry posts was titled: “India-Bhutan: Friend or Master.” Unless India begins to come across as the former – again – in the eyes of the hurting Bhutanese, it may not be able to hold on to its geopolitical need to be the latter.